Breaking Bad - Controversial Opinions!

Avoidable or bad luck? BBC tonight "One Wild Winter in the Scottish Mountains" claims experts know why. "The avalanche does not know that you are an expert" wrote Andre Roch. Scotland has always lurched between a martime snowpack where instablities are short lived, and a continental snowpack where stabilities or instabilities are longer lived.  It's not new, or a revelation! I thought I would post the article below as it provides another side of the debate where some folks voice the opinion that there is no bad luck - you make your own choices therefore avalanches are avoidable.  True perhaps - but its never that simple and to err is human ........................

Please click on the images to enlarge and read

Mistakes in Avalanche Rescues

Worth sharing this old extract from the Avalanche Review

The Avalanche Review, Vol. 9, No.6, April 1991Copyright © All Rights Reserved; AAAP

Don't Create a Bigger Accident than Already Exists: 

Mistakes in Avalanche Rescues 

by Dale Atkins

On June 14, 1987, a sheriff's rescue group responded to the call of a mountain climber buried by an avalanche on the slopes of Mount Borah. Even though trained personnel from Idaho Mountain Rescue were on hand at the staging area, the sheriff kept them from entering the field. He indicated that his personnel would go the site first and assess the situation to see what resources were needed. According to the American Alpine Club's Accidents in North American Mountaineering, the sheriff's team of four, wearing blue jeans and sneakers and carrying one rope and a carton of soft drinks, could not reach the accident site, as the group lacked experience and the necessary equipment. With darkness approaching, the sheriff, concerned for his personnel, secured a helicopter to drop sleeping bags and food for his team. On a fly over at 4700 meters, the helicopter crew dropped the supplies. The rescuers at 3450 meters dove for cover. Needless to say, the supplies were well scattered during the 1250-meter fall.

The rescuers survived the bombardment of supplies and survived the night, only to be chased away the next day by an electric storm. At that point, on June 15, the sheriff suspended the search. On June 19, the sheriff's small team returned, but this time with members of Idaho Mountain Rescue. Finally, after probing, they recovered the body the next day.

Mistakes, Errors, Slipups, Blunders The first rule of any search-and-rescue operation is "don't create a bigger accident than what already exists." Though few avalanche rescue operations are conducted without any problems, trained and experienced rescuers practicing good decision-making, with a dose of flexibility, keep most rescues on track. After reviewing the three volumes of The Snowy Torrents, reflecting on my own experiences on over 20 avalanche search-and-rescue operations, and speaking with other rescue types, I have put together a list of repeated mistakes made during avalanche rescues and I offer some solutions to avoid these errors. "Repeated mistakes" is the important term; all the mistakes identified have been repeated by others at different times and in different places. I follow a theme started by Dale Gallagher in the first volume of The Snowy Torrents to "point out the mistakes as lessons for us all, not as a criticism of the individuals involved." Mistakes made by rescuers can be grouped into four categories: (1) poor organization, (2) mishandling the witness, (3) inadequate hasty search, and (4) mismanaged search. Most of the cases involve organized rescue efforts; I also looked at small group rescues where members of the party involved in the accident made obvious mistakes, usually at the hasty search stage. Poor OrganizationThe four points listed below arise from a lack of organization and virtually guarantee chaos to some extent during the rescue: no plan divided or uncertain leadership lack of proper equipment failure to request available rescuers Organizational problems generally arise from two sources: no plan or an unpracticed plan. Even volunteer search-and-rescue groups and ski patrols must have a written plan, so that all members understand their potential role in any avalanche rescue. Besides spelling out the personnel responsibilities, the rescue plan should cover equipment management and identify additional resources such as other rescue groups, helicopters, lighting systems, food, etc. Controlling the chaos arising from rescues is one of the duties of the rescue leader. The lack of proper equipment, both rescue and personal, has slowed down many a rescue. A rescue plan will aid in having the rescue equipment where it's needed and when it's needed, but there is no substitute for an experienced watchful eye for making sure that individuals are properly equipped. For rescues in and near developed areas, being well equipped is not nearly as critical as it is for rescuers going into the backcountry. Be alert: trained rescuers are just as apt to forget a piece of equipment or clothing, or to not have the right gear, as volunteers. For example, soft-soled boots, like packs and snowmobile boots, are perfect for probing, but can be dangerous if one must climb a steep icy bed surface. Using an ink board and Mylar overlays to track search efforts. Peak 7 accident near Breckenridge C0, February 1987. Photo by Dale Atkins Once again a rescue plan will help in securing additional rescuers. The plan should list other available rescue groups and at least two contact names and telephone numbers. Don't let pride stand in the way of performing the mission, as the sheriff in Idaho did. Ski patrols and rescue teams have suffered from this same affliction at one time or another. Not long ago in Colorado, during one backcountry avalanche search, one ski patrol would not call in a second one, even though the first had only four members available, and the second had 28 members waiting less than 20 minutes away. Call in all available rescuers. Rescuers would much rather be requested and then turned back while en route than not be called at all. It is not known if an avalanche victim has died on account of a poorly organized rescue operation. But in one case, in 1958, in Utah, a rescuer was buried and killed in a second avalanche after the rescue command fell apart, lost control of the operation, and allowed column teams to scatter on their way to the accident site. Mishandling the Witness It is within this category that the greatest number of mistakes have been made. Blame cannot be a fixed to a witness, but rather to the rescuers for how they handle, interact, interview, and interpret the words of the eyewitness. In one extreme case a zealous sheriff, shortly after a large accident, told the press that the two eyewitnesses, who also triggered the slide that buried and killed four skiers, would be arrested and charged. Rumors hinted at felony manslaughter. Fearing the law, the two quickly went into hiding; it took the better part of a day to get the witnesses to come forward to assist in the rescue. No charges were ever filed. Common mistakes regarding witnesses are the following: Inaccurate information regarding the: last seen area number of victims location of the accident site failure to return to the same vantage point failure to hold and question witness emotionally unstable witness failure to keep track of the witness at the accident site Though a witness would never purposely give bad information, experience and the record show that inaccurate information is not uncommon. Poor interviewing skills on the part of the rescuer is a problem, as well as the uncertain witness who did not carefully watch the accident happen. Because of inaccurate information we no longer use the phrase "last seen point," but now use "last seen area." Buried avalanche victims have been found above or well to the side of the last seen point, out of the anticipated flow line. Several times I have found that witnesses identify the place where they last saw their buddy somewhere between the actual last seen point and the point to which the person was headed. For example, in 1987 two snowmobilers were headed towards a stand of trees when they triggered the slide. They marked the last seen point immediately next to the trees. In reality the two snowmobilers were caught several hundred feet away from the trees. One of the first questions asked by a rescuer is "How many people are buried?" What seems like a simple question, requiring one simple answer, is not always so simple. Witnesses have given inaccurate information on the number of buried victims. Inaccurate counts seem to arise when a witness, typically caught in the same slide, thought that other people were close by but did not know the others. The point is that when the witness knows the people nearby, he or she pays closer attention to who they are and where everybody is on the slope. Rescues have ended prematurely, only to have the rescuers called back hours later to search for and then find someone who was reported missing later in the day. If there is any question as to the number of victims, search the entire debris area. Though rare, in two cases the witness was too emotionally unstable to give information to the rescuers. Usually witnesses are very willing to assist, and often, if rested, make good searchers. In 17 years of mountain rescue work, I have not encountered this discomfiture, but a situation I have experienced is the grieving loved one who arrives at the command base. Both situations-the grieving person and the emotionally unstable witness-require giving comfort and support. If faced with either situation, arrange for a clergy member to come to the command base and meet with the person. Having a man or woman of the cloth present seems to offer greater emotional support than a caring rescuer, sheriff's deputy, or social worker. The failure to hold and question witnesses has caused grief for several rescue leaders. Though it is sometimes easier said than done, be certain that you hold the witness and make sure to get names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all witnesses. Assign someone to keep track of them, since, with no record, once a witness leaves, so do the answers to your questions. Only a few weeks ago, in Colorado, a slide buried a portion of US 40 on Berthoud Pass. It was suspected that two out-of-bounds lift skiers might have been trapped in the debris. Three separate groups of skiers reported the slide, and all were allowed to slip away with not even one name or phone number recorded. If that happens and you think someone might be buried, search the avalanche first and ask questions later. Do not waste time trying to track down unavailable witnesses. Getting the witness back to the same vantage point is critical for getting accurate information. A witness trying to identify tracks or place the last seen point from somewhere other than the spot from which he or she saw the accident will make mistakes. It will require extra effort but get the witness back to the original vantage point as soon as possible. Once you have contacted the witness, keeping track of him or her is very important. During a search next to a ski area a number of years ago, a witness, who was riding a lift, slipped away for more skiing. In this case the missing witness caused only a minor inconvenience to the search operation because the search area was very small. However, during a rescue in 1967, an eyewitness wandered away from the accident site. Hours later the witness, a boy, was found dead from hypothermia less than a mile away. Inadequate Hasty Search A hasty search performed by survivors or witnesses of an avalanche is being done while the clock is ticking on buried victims. Therefore mistakes made may truly have deadly consequences. Four types of mistakes made during the hasty search phase are: not doing one not searching the entire area missing visual clues not being proficient with avalanche rescue beacons not finding the accident site The first two points are related. In some accidents, members of the party left the site without doing a thorough hasty search and missed visual clues that might have saved a life. In December of 1984, two backcountry skiers were caught in a slide near Aspen, Colorado. The survivor dug herself out, made a fast check of the debris and left the site to notify rescuers. Hours later, a hasty search by the rescue team revealed a ski tip sticking from the snow. The victim, shallowly buried, had died. Organized rescue teams have also done incomplete hasty searches, or not hasty searched the entire area, before starting the probe lines. Only later as the probe lines marched up the debris did rescuers spot an obvious ski or pole sticking out of the snow. The initial hasty search of the avalanche just a few weeks ago on Berthoud Pass (mentioned earlier) consisted of a beacon search. Probelines were begun immediately on the roadway so that the road could be opened as quickly as possible. Only later were the likely burial areas, about two dozen different trees, searched. Fortunately no one was found in the slide. The best documented case of probing too soon happened in Washington in late 1962. Shortly after probe lines were initiated, a ski pole was found in the snow. still attached to the skier. The skier, unconscious when dug out, quickly regained consciousness and made a complete recovery. Avalanche rescue beacons are lifesavers but require practice, practice, and practice. Chaos struck a group of experienced and well-equipped backcountry skiers in Utah, in 1979, when one member of the group did not switch his beacon back to receive after two other skiers in the group were buried. Confusion of the three signals caused a delay of several minutes. One skier survived, but the other did not. The time lost because of the beacon confusion cannot be directly linked to the skier's death, but it is certain that a less experienced group would have been hopelessly confused and two fatalities would have resulted. Lady Luck was with a group of four backcountry skiers in Colorado in 1988, when three of the skiers were completely buried in a small slide they triggered. The group was well equipped, and all had beacons and shovels, but only one of the members was trained and practiced in the use of an avalanche rescue beacon. Two others in the group had very limited training, while the fourth had no training whatsoever. It was this fourth member who was not caught in the slide. Relying on instincts, rather than a beacon he did not know how to use, he quickly spotted a hand protruding from the snow and dug out the most experienced member who in turn used his beacon to find the other two buried skiers. They survived, and today all are very proficient with avalanche rescue beacons. Remember to listen as you search the debris, as dozens of shallowly buried avalanche victims have been recovered alive when rescuers heard yells coming from under the snow. In one case a tired shoveler moved away from the search area to rest. As he sat down on the snow, the still conscious buried victim heard him and yelled. The startled rescuer quickly alerted the others and soon the man was free after a four-hour burial. If the hasty search fails to turn up clues or enough clues to establish the likely burial areas, go back and redo the hasty search. The more clues, the smaller the search area. Once probe lines begin, the speed of any rescue falls dramatically. Even with a coherent witness, locating an accident site in stormy weather can be difficult, and nightfall might make it impossible. It was mentioned above in the section on handling witnesses, and it deserves additional comment here: incomplete questioning has misled a number of rescue leaders in determining the exact location of an accident. Some hasty teams have wasted time in trying to get to an accident because of vague or poor directions. More careful questioning might reveal the easiest and safest access for the hasty team. Mismanaged Search Typically, once the probe lines begin, few serious mistakes occur while searching the debris. Minor setbacks do arise, such as rescuers dropping personal clothing on the debris and someone else believing the piece to be a clue. But four serious mistakes have arisen from time to time: not probing the entire debris not starting at the toe not digging where dogs alert contaminating the debris for search dogs The first is not probing the entire debris. Imagine the surprise of one highway department heavy equipment operator clearing a road when he unexpectedly found a buried station wagon. The driver of the buried car had been buried eight hours, and now was saved more by providence than by plan. Rescuers, hours earlier, had probed part of the debris and stopped after deciding no other vehicles were buried. In several rescues probe lines were not started at the toe of the debris. Perhaps there was some clue that warranted searching higher up, but in several cases the victims were found later, in the toe of the debris. The nose of a trained avalanche dog is perhaps the most efficient search tool a rescuer has. On several occasions dogs alerted only to be pulled away because the spot was not where the human rescuers expected to find a buried victim. Trust the dog. The contamination problem arises from sloppy rescuers. Not always is it possible to get a rescue dog to the accident site with the first wave of rescuers, so it is important to keep the debris clean. Sure, a trail of tobacco juice marks where the probe line searched, but the extra scent makes the dog's job even more difficult. Do not allow rescuers to throw food scraps, spit tobacco, or relieve themselves on the debris. Some Final Thoughts Many more lives will be saved by education, avalanche control work, and precautionary measures than will be saved by rescuers. Most buried victims will not survive long enough, no matter how well organized, prepared, and equipped the rescuers are. But some buried victims do survive, and all victims should be given the benefit of the doubt that they might be found alive. Mistakes and problems do arise in avalanche rescues, but we can learn from the misfortunes of past rescues to prevent future mistakes. Organized rescue groups must have a written rescue plan and have the correct equipment already located in strategic locations. Persons who may assume leadership roles must know the plan. Every season the plan must be practiced and updated. Conduct simulated rescues and practice sessions periodically to keep rescuers sharp. An organized, prepared, and well equipped rescue team may make a difference and can save someone's life-maybe your own!

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Smartphone Avalanche Search Apps

Smartphone Avalanche Search Apps—A Review

James Floyer, PhD

Senior Forecaster: Canadian Avalanche Centre

Discussion paper: October, 2013

Introduction

Smartphones are popular—in Canada, around 56% of people use one1. Recently, apps have appeared on

the market designed to allow one smartphone to search for another in avalanche rescue scenarios. In this

way, users are given avalanche victim search functionality on their handheld device. There are currently

three apps available: iSis Intelligent (Mountain) Rescue System; Snøg Avalanche Buddy; and SnoWhere.

The iSis and Snøg apps are available for iPhone only. SnoWhere is an Android only app. Such apps are

referred to as smartphone avalanche search apps.

This paper presents a technical discussion of the operation and limitations of these devices. The suitability

of this technology is analysed from a public safety point of view. Existing literature was reviewed and app

developers were contacted to provide detail on how their systems work as well as test results2. Technical

and rescue experts were consulted for specific advice. No field testing was carried out as part of this

review, and details of how the systems work are gleaned in part through marketing literature, including

videos posted on developers’ websites, and in part through theoretical considerations. Note also, at the

time of preparation, no independent tests or reviews were available.

How they work

Smartphone avalanche search apps make use of various two‐way communication technologies including:

cell network; WiFi; and Bluetooth. Additionally, two of the apps make use of GPS signals. Each app uses a

slightly different set of technologies to communicate its location to another smartphone, which must also

have the identical app installed. Table 1 lists the technologies the different apps make use of.

When searching using WiFi or Bluetooth signals, a smartphone app permits searches in a similar way to an

older‐style analogue avalanche transceiver. Signal strength may be displayed as a number (SnoWhere) or

on a bar chart (Snøg), with an increase in signal strength indicating increasing proximity to the victim.

Signal direction is poorly resolved, as smartphones only have one antenna (per communication

technology), and the orientation of that antenna may not be known to the user.

The SnoWhere and iSis apps use GPS to aid search location. The location of the victim shows up on a

basemap, allowing the searcher to use mapping functions to guide them towards the victim.

Two apps also include functionality that notifies other rescuers of an avalanche incident either

automatically (iSis) or manually (SnoWhere). These features could be useful within the broader context of

search and rescue, including avalanche search and rescue. However, since this paper focuses on the victim

search functionality of smartphone avalanche search apps, these features are not considered further here.

1 Google Report: Our Mobile Planet – Understanding the Mobile Consumer. Ipsos MediaCT. May 2013.

2 Two of the three app developers: Piranha Stuff BV (Snøg’s developers) and Charcoal Frost Ltd (SnoWhere’s

developers) responded to our enquiries.

Table 1: Summary of search and communication technologies employed by three avalanche search apps.

App Primary search (Range) Fine search Notification

iSis

(iPhone 4/5)

GPS location sent by WiFi or cell

internet connection (1000 m claimed)

or direct via Bluetooth (45 m claimed)

Micro‐grid search

using Bluetooth

Automatic (using trajectory

analysis) alert from victim or

manual alert from rescuer

Snøg

(Android)

WiFi signal strength analysis (50 m

claimed)

Same as primary None

SnoWhere

(iPhone

3/4/5)

GPS location sent by Bluetooth (40 m

claimed for iPhone 3, 45 m for iPhone

4 and 5)

Map‐assisted

Bluetooth signal

strength analysis

Rescuer can share location

using email or SMS

Range issues

WiFi and Bluetooth signals are strongly affected by transmission through water‐based mediums, including

snow. Therefore, signal strength is reduced when the transmitting device is buried in an avalanche; this

effect is amplified if the debris is dense and moist—often the case for all but the smallest avalanches.

Signal strength is also affected by the presence of trees, rocks or the victim’s own body lying over the top

of their phone.

In their marketing materials, developers report ranges of between 40 and 50 m for WiFi/Bluetooth

searches. These ranges likely reflect best case scenarios for relatively shallow burials, or devices placed on

the surface of the snow. Snøg Avalanche Buddy developers have reported that forested terrain presents

difficulties for WiFi transmission. Effective range was reduced to around 12 m during their tests in

forested terrain. While independent tests have not been carried out, similar range reductions might be

expected for deep burials in avalanche debris, and/or when the device is shielded by a victim’s body.

Similar range reductions are expected for Bluetooth signals.

GPS accuracy is insufficient for precise victim location. SnoWhere developers claim a “best reported

accuracy” of 5 m with an iPhone 4/5. Accuracy values of 7.5 to 15 m are probably more realistic for

devices buried under 2 m of snow, since GPS performance degrades rapidly with burial depth3. Searchers

will still have to switch to WiFi/Bluetooth signal search mode for the fine search phase. If the GPS is not

already switched on and tracking (which requires considerable battery power), it may take some time to

acquire a signal when buried, if it is able to do so at all.

GPS technology offers, at best, a coarse search feature to bring the searcher to within approximately 10 m

of the victim. At worst, if a GPS location were incorrect, searchers could actually be led away from the

victim, believing they were moving closer towards them.

Compatibility

International standards4 dictate avalanche transceivers transmit and receive at a frequency of 457 kHz.

Regardless of brand, all current avalanche transceivers are compatible with each other. Compatibility

3 Schleppe, J. and Lachapelle, G. GPS Tracking Performance under Deposited Snow. ION GNSS, Sept. 2006.

4 ETSI EN 300 718‐1 V1.2.1. Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Avalanche Beacons;

Transmitter‐receiver systems; Part 1: Technical characteristics and test methods. European Standard

(Telecommunications series). May 2001.between transceivers is a fundamental tenet of avalanche rescue; even older analogue transceivers5

operate on the 457 kHz frequency and are compatible with more recent digital models6.

In contrast, smartphones do not transmit at 457 kHz and therefore do not (and cannot) adhere to

international transceiver standards, regardless of what software is installed. They are not compatible with

457 kHz avalanche transceivers.

Further, smartphone avalanche search apps are not compatible with each other. This means all members

of a backcountry party must use the same smartphone platform with the same software installed to have

a useable rescue system. This creates heightened potential for someone to assume they have a

compatible smartphone device, while in actual fact they have a different and incompatible device to the

ones used by their companions. This incompatibility with existing avalanche transceivers and lack of intercompatibility

between the apps makes these applications, at their current level of development,

particularly inadequate from an avalanche rescue perspective.

Battery life

Battery life is another critical limitation with the current state of smartphone technology. International

standards for avalanche transceivers dictate that devices should be able to transmit for 200 hours at

+10°C and then still have enough power to search for 1 hour at ‐10°C. Many smartphone batteries do not

last for a full day of use on one charge, especially when power intensive features, such as GPS location,

Bluetooth or WiFi communication modes are employed. Battery drain is higher in areas with no cell

coverage, as phones constantly seek a signal. The effect of the cold further reduces battery life. Many

phones (including iPhone models) do not have user‐replaceable batteries.

SAR groups report rescue victims frequently have trouble communicating with rescuers at the end of the

day as their smartphones run out of battery power. AdventureSmart, Canada’s national SAR prevention

program, recommends users switch their phones off to conserve battery power in case of emergency

situations. Users of smartphone avalanche search apps potentially face an unacceptable choice: switch

their phone off to conserve battery power for communication but disable their avalanche safety device, or

maintain power to their avalanche safety device but run the risk of not having effective communication

for emergency rescue use.

Robustness, reliability and ease of use

International avalanche transceiver standards include stringent drop and immersion tests that must be

passed before any device comes to market. Additionally, devices must include a carrying system designed

to guard against being ripped off during an avalanche. While some smartphone models are reasonably

robust, many are not, and may be susceptible to water ingress or shock. While smartphone operating

systems are generally good, software crashes do occur, sometimes requiring a reboot; these may be

caused by other installed software and not necessarily the avalanche search app itself. If this were to

happen during a rescue, valuable search time would be lost. Phones are not supplied with a carrying

(457 kHz was adopted by the International Commission for Alpine Rescue (IKAR) in 1986. Some models

manufactured before that date operated at 2.275 kHz and are not compatible with 457 kHz transceivers.

6 The Canadian Avalanche Centre recommends the exclusive use of 3‐antenna digital transceivers (with no brand

preference), due to their increased performance in a range of burial scenarios)system, increasing the possibility of the device becoming detached from the victim during an avalanche,or dropped in the snow during a search.

Most smartphones rely on touch screens, which are not operable wearing thick gloves or mittens and may

not work effectively if the screen is covered with snow or water. The large size of screens creates

vulnerability, as they might be easily cracked. To their credit, app developers appear to have favoured

relatively simple interfaces for their software; however, it may still be necessary to navigate a menu

system, or turn additional software or phone features off to properly operate the avalanche search app.

There is the possibility for distraction from an incoming call, email or text during a search, which might be

less easily ignored if the smartphone is in use in the rescuer’s hand rather than stashed away in a pocket

or backpack.

Interference

Recent studies7,8 have analysed the effects of interference on avalanche transceiver performance for a

range of devices including cell phones. Based on these studies, the Canadian Avalanche Centre

recommends the following separation distances between an avalanche transceiver and other electronic

devices:

 Transmit mode (Send): 20 cm

 Search mode (Receive): 50 cm

It is not known for certain whether dedicated avalanche transceivers would experience additional

problems if used in proximity to smartphones running avalanche search apps. However, since

WiFi/Bluetooth frequencies (~2.4 GHz) are quite different from the 457 kHz frequency, the risk of

additional interference from the proximal use of these apps is probably low. (Note: as previously stated,

smartphone avalanche search apps are NOT compatible with 457 kHz transceivers. The discussion here is

whether the incidental use of such an app would have an impact on a search between two or more

dedicated 457 kHz transceivers.)

Interference between Bluetooth and WiFi signals has been documented and occurs because the operating

frequencies are close together. This should not pose a problem if only one communication technology is

used at any one time and the other transmitting mode is switched off. However, other installed apps, or

features activated by the user may turn WiFi or Bluetooth signals on, increasing the possibility of

interference. Other possible sources of interference are receiving a cell phone call and using the GPS

receiver and other Bluetooth‐enabled electronic devices carried by users, such as cameras, headphones

etc.—the effect of these on smartphone search app performance is currently unknown.

Marketing

Avalanche search apps are being actively marketed as software that turns a smartphone into an avalanche

transceiver. None of the developers claim the software/phone combination will adhere to international

transceiver standards. In fact, at least two developers have specific disclaimers that tell the user the

system is not certified and does not meet international standards for avalanche transceivers. Despite the

7 Barkhausen, J. The Effect of External Interference on Avalanche Transceiver Functionality. In Proceedings

International Snow Science Workshop (ISSW 2012). Anchorage, AK, USA, Sept. 2012.

8 Genswein, M., Atkins, D., Obad, J., Grady, E., Piche, M., Guyn, T., Whelan, R. and Brattlien, K. Recommendation on

how avoid Interference Issues in Companion and Organized Avalanche Rescue. 2013.

Box 2759, Revelstoke, BC V0E 2S0 ph: (250) 837-2141 / fax: 1-866-366-2094 info@avalanche.ca / www.avalanche.ca

disclaimers, the marketing intentions are quite clear from text, videos and discussions on developer’s web

pages, Facebook accounts, and other communications: these apps are being touted specifically for use in

finding buried victims in the event of an avalanche.

One marketing statement from the Google Play store about the Snøg Avalanche Buddy states: “Snøg is a

‘missing person tracker’ tool. A tool designed to quickly locate and find a victim, buried under an

avalanche.” SnoWhere developers include this personal avalanche connection statement: “20 years ago

our founder was buried in an avalanche within bounds in poor visibility. He only survived because he was

quickly discovered by a passing boy who thought he had found a hat. That experience inspired SnoWhere:

to help ensure no‐one else’s survival relies on luck.” iSis developers are probably the most aggressive in

pitching their app as a dedicated avalanche rescue system, and include a professionally edited video9

containing a mock avalanche incident with a group of skiers who have apparently left the confines of the

resort. The incident is complete with images of a skier triggering an avalanche and being buried by snow,

before his companions use their phone with the iSis app to rescue the victim.

Legal and ethical issues

While it is clear that avalanche search apps are being actively marketed as software that enables

smartphones to be used as avalanche search devices, the legal status of marketing/selling an app that

turns an otherwise compliant smartphone into an avalanche search device that does not meet

international standards is unclear. Additionally, it is not a simple matter to establish whether international

standards for avalanche transceivers are binding or voluntary in the Canadian context. Specific legal

advice would be required to establish these points in Canada.

Regardless of legal state, developers do have an ethical obligation to ensure products they bring to market

do not have a negative impact on public safety. For a lifesaving device with mission‐critical operating

parameters that relies on successful communication with other similar devices, independent testing in

real‐world scenarios is imperative. None has been made available to us, and to our knowledge none has

yet been carried out. The numerous and serious flaws in the current state of smartphone avalanche

search app technology give justifiable cause for concern that public safety may be compromised by the

introduction of this kind of avalanche rescue device.

Conclusion and discussion

The CAC does not consider any of the existing apps discussed here to be viable devices for avalanche

companion rescue. There are serious concerns and vulnerabilities with a range of important aspects of the

technology. The most critical of these are:

 lack of compatibility with existing avalanche transceivers

 lack of compatibility between different operating systems and software brands

 smartphone battery life

 range concerns in real‐world scenarios (i.e. when buried in avalanche debris)

Additional concerns are: system robustness; smartphone reliability; ease of use; interference issues; and

the possibility of distraction during a search.

9 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qpqnszYXdmg&feature=player_embedded

Box 2759, Revelstoke, BC V0E 2S0 ph: (250) 837-2141 / fax: 1-866-366-2094 info@avalanche.ca / www.avalanche.ca

There are good reasons for having in place international standards for avalanche transceivers. Of course,

standards may change and evolve with time to reflect new technologies. But this must be done in a

transparent, collaborative manner that maintains at its core the best interests of public safety. Present

development of smartphone avalanche rescue apps appears haphazard, is unregulated, and is potentially

dangerous to end users, who may confuse this technology with legitimate avalanche transceivers. The

option to spend only a few dollars on a cheap app in place of spending several hundreds of dollars on a

dedicated avalanche transceiver may be tempting to many, particularly novice users. However, the choice

to use such an app as a safety device when entering avalanche terrain could imperil all members of the

user’s backcountry group.

Some may argue that the ubiquity of smartphone devices might make up for the shortfall in performance

of avalanche search apps. Under this pretext, the likelihood of an avalanche victim being without any form

of avalanche rescue device is lower, which compensates for any reduced search performance. This

argument is invalid for the following reasons.

 First, the critical issues of cross‐compatibility, inter‐compatibility, poor battery life and range

under avalanche debris preclude any kind of benefit from smartphone ubiquity.

 Second, apps must be manually installed and activated, so smartphone ubiquity does not equate

to a ubiquity of avalanche search devices.

 Third, on account of the urgency of avalanche companion rescue with target rescue times (i.e. the

combination of searching, pinpoint location using a probe and extrication by digging) of 10

minutes or less10, substandard avalanche search devices are likely to have a considerable negative

impact on victim mortality.

 Fourth, there is potential for a significant negative impact on users of dedicated avalanche

transceivers by the presence of smartphone avalanche search app technology: that is the

possibility for people who would have otherwise purchased (or borrowed or rented) a dedicated

avalanche transceiver to be tempted to download an app onto their smartphone instead. These

people may not be aware their smartphone search app is not compatible with other group

member’s dedicated avalanche transceivers, so putting themselves and their companions at risk.

Recommendations

In light of the deficiencies of current smartphone avalanche search app technology, the Canadian

Avalanche Centre is implementing the following strategies:

1. Maintain the prevailing culture of using dedicated 457 kHz avalanche transceivers during winter

backcountry recreation by continuing to promote the Canadian Avalanche Centre’s and other

partners’ existing awareness campaigns that recommend the use of dedicated avalanche

transceivers, probes and shovels for all group members.

2. Discourage the adoption of smartphone avalanche search app technology in place of dedicated

457 kHz transceivers. This might take the form of targeted education campaigns directed at

specific user groups. Campaigns should highlight the benefits to users of dedicated 457 kHz

transceivers over smartphone avalanche search apps.

10 Haegeli, P., Falk, M., Brugger, H., Etter, H‐J. Comparison of avalanche survival patterns in Canada and Switzerland.

Canadian Medical Association Journal. doi: 10.1503/cmaj.101435. Mar. 2011.

Box 2759, Revelstoke, BC V0E 2S0 ph: (250) 837-2141 / fax: 1-866-366-2094 info@avalanche.ca / www.avalanche.ca

3. Respond to media and public enquiries regarding this new technology, including being prepared

to respond in the event of an incident involving avalanche search apps, either in Canada or

elsewhere.

4. Advocate that new avalanche search technologies, especially those that deviate from agreedupon

international standards, be developed collaboratively, thoroughly and with transparency.

Developers must be reminded of their ethical obligation to ensure full and independent testing of

their rescue systems prior to going to market.